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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Statement of the research problem 
Botswana is a stable democracy with a good human rights record. Botswana is ranked ‘free’ 
by Freedom House, receiving a score of 3 out of a worst possible 7 on political rights and 2 
on civil rights.1 Freedom House also ranks Botswana as one of only 8 ‘free’ countries among 
the 48 states of sub-Saharan Africa, with high scores for both political and civil rights.2 
Notwithstanding this record, there have been repeated calls for Botswana to establish a 
national human rights institution (NHRI) which is compliant with the Principles Relating to 
the Establishment of National Human Rights Institutions (Paris Principles).3  
Various reasons have been cited to illustrate the need for a NHRI in Botswana. In the 
interviews administered by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Southern 
Africa (EISA), three respondents felt that a NHRI is necessary because it would enhance 
Botswana’s record on human rights.4 This response is apt. Fombad has drawn attention to 
widespread patterns of discrimination and the serious inadequacies of exclusive reliance on 
judicial avenues for redressing human rights violations in Botswana.5 These are challenges 
that he reasoned would better be addressed by the establishment of a NHRI. The other 
reasons cited by Fombad include the need for an agency that can among other things manage 
in a programmatic manner, some of the policy implications of different interpretations of the 
                                                          
1 Evaluation of Candidates for 2011-2014 Membership of the Human Rights Council as Submitted to UNGA  
  Member States on May 17, 2011. Presented at United Nations Headquarters, New York, 19 May 2011. 
  Available at http://blog.unwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/Rating-the-2011-candidates-to-UNHRC.pdf,    
  accessed on 31 January 2014. 
2 Botswana Country Overview 2012/2013, available at   
   http://www.econsult.co.bw/tempex/BOTSWANA%20COUNTRY%20&%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%2  
  02012.pdf, accessed on 31 January 2014. 
3 UN General Assembly resolution 48/134 of December 20, 1993, available at 
   http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm, accessed on 10 January 2014. The document was  
   named after the place where it was adopted (Paris). 
4 D Mpabanga ‘Promoting the Effectiveness of Democracy Protection Institutions in Southern Africa:  
   Office of the Ombudsman in Botswana’ (2009) at page 35. 
5 CM Fombad, ‘The Constitutional Protection against Discrimination in Botswana’ (2004) 53 The International     
   and Comparative Law Quarterly 139 at page 170. 
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Bill of rights without necessarily litigating those rights, as well as to discharge promotional 
and advisory functions.6  
Fombad is not alone in calling for the establishment of a NHRI in Botswana. In his 
annual report to the National Assembly, Lepodise, the former Ombudsman of Botswana, 
premised his recommendation for the establishment of a NHRI on an increasing number of 
complaints of human rights violations in the country.7 Dinokopila has also called for the 
establishment of a NHRI in Botswana, pointing out that Botswana’s human rights record is 
weakening due to the following factors: retention of the death penalty; prohibition of 
termination of pregnancy by choice; growing concerns of racial discrimination, xenophobia 
and other forms of intolerance; marginalisation of women, children, refugees and asylum 
seekers, members of the gay and lesbian community, and prisoners; and Botswana’s backlog 
of reports in almost all international human rights protection bodies. 8 
The international community has also noted these concerns. The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is concerned that the definition of 
discrimination provided under section 3 of the Constitution of Botswana does not prohibit 
discrimination on the grounds of descent and national or ethnic origin.9 The CERD is further 
concerned that section 15 of the Constitution of Botswana permits discrimination which is 
not justified under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) as it is not applied pursuant to, neither is it proportional to the 
achievement of a legitimate aim.10  
The CERD has further taken note of Botswana’s willingness to ensure better 
representation in the House of Chiefs through amendment of sections 77 to 79 of the 
                                                          
6 CM Fombad, ‘The protection of human rights in Botswana: an overview of the regulatory framework’  in  
   CM Fombad (ed) ‘Essays on the Law of Botswana’ (2007) 139 at page 29. 
7 E Keoreng ‘Ombudsman calls for the establishment of a national human rights commission’ Mmegi    
  Newspaper 17April 2009, available at  
   http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=13&dir=2009/April/Friday17, accessed on 10 January 2014. 
8 BR Dinokopila, ‘Bringing the Paris Principles home: Towards the establishment of a National Human Rights  
   Commission in Botswana’ (2012) 4 University of Botswana Law Journal 45 at pages 46 and 68. 
9 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Concluding Observations, Botswana,   
   4 April 2006, CERD/C/BWA/CO/16, paragraph 7, available at:  
    http://www.refworld.org/docid/453779770.html, accessed on 3 June 2014. 
10 CERD/C/BWA/CO/16, op cit (n9), paragraph 8. 
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Constitution. However, concern has been expressed that such amendment has reproduced 
discriminatory rules relating to the participation of ethnic groups in this institution as it does 
not recognise some ethnic groups as part of the tribes of Botswana.11 In addition, the CERD 
has noted that the Tribal Territories Act contravenes the ICERD as it discriminates against 
non-Tswana ethnic groups.12 The CERD  has also noted that Botswana is reluctant to 
recognize the existence of indigenous peoples on its territory hence it has urged Botswana to 
respect and protect the existence and cultural identities of all ethnic groups, as well as to 
review its policy on indigenous people.13  
The United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) has also expressed 
concern that the exceptions to the right not to be discriminated against, particularly those 
relating to adoption, non-citizens, marriage, devolution of property, burial and divorce as 
provided for under sections 15 (4) (b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution of Botswana do not 
comply with articles 2, 3, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).14 The UNHRC has further criticised Botswana for overcrowded prisons and a large 
number of prison remands.15  
The concerns raised above suggest that there are legal gaps which necessitate the 
establishment of a NHRI in Botswana. In addition to the legal gaps identified, another 
concern relating to the institutions that protect human rights in Botswana has been raised. The 
High Court has been the main mechanism for the protection of human rights since 
independence. Section 18 of the Constitution of Botswana defines the role of the courts of 
Botswana in protecting human rights. There also exist institutions that support democracy 
and/or protect human rights in Botswana namely: Independent Electoral Commission; Office 
of the Ombudsman and Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime. Among these, the 
                                                          
11 CERD/C/BWA/CO/16, op cit (n9), paragraph 10.  
12 A/57/18, United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHRC), concluding observation of the  
    Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Botswana, 23 August 2002, paragraph 301, available  
    at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f52f7aa4.html, accessed on 01 August 2014. 
13 CERD/C/BWA/CO/16, op cit (n9), paragraph 9. 
14 CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1, United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), Consideration of  reports submitted    
    by state parties under article 40 of the Covenant : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights :  
    concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee : Botswana, 24 April 2008,  paragraph 9, available  
    at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/48c4f4b32.html, accessed on 19 June 2014. 
15 CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1, op cit (n14), paragraph 17. 
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Ombudsman Office has been presented by the government of Botswana to the international 
community as an institution with a mandate to promote and protect human rights.16 This 
notwithstanding, the UNHRC maintains that there is no NHRI in Botswana, and therefore 
called for the establishment of such an institution in accordance with the Paris Principles.17   
 
1.2.  Research questions 
In light of the statement of the research problem as expounded above, this dissertation seeks 
to answer the following research questions: 
Whether there exist legal and institutional gaps that need to be filled by the 
establishment of a NHRI in Botswana?  
How will the establishment of a NHRI fill gaps in Botswana’s existing legal and 
institutional framework? 
What are the minimum standards, guidelines and principles which must be adhered to 
in order to establish an effective NHRI?  
What lessons can Botswana learn from South Africa and Zimbabwe in order to 
establish a NHRI Botswana’s which complies with the Paris Principles? 
 
1.3.  Methodology 
The first research question is answered through an analysis of Botswana’s legal and 
institutional framework to determine their effectiveness in human rights promotion and 
protection. This will help to determine how the establishment of a NHRI will fill gaps in the 
existing legal and institutional framework thereby answering the second research question. 
To answer the third research question, a discussion of the Paris Principles which are 
internationally recognised as the minimum standards which NHRIs must comply with in 
order to function effectively will be done.  In addition, the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) will be used 
                                                          
16 National report submitted in accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council  
    Resolution 5/1, (A/HRC/WG.6/3/BWA/1 of 5 September 2008), Para 13. Available at   
   http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session3/BW/A_HRC_WG6_3_BWA_1_Botswana_E.pdf, 
    accessed on 11 June 2014. 
17 CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1 op cit (n14) at paragraph 8.  
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as case studies for Botswana to draw lessons from. Emphasis will be placed on evaluating 
their compliance with the Paris Principles.  
The SAHRC is chosen as a case study because it forms part of the 16 ‘A’ status 
NHRIs representing the four regions of the International Coordinating Committee of National 
Human Rights Institutions (ICC). The ICC is a legal entity which was formed by NHRIs at 
the international conference held in Tunisia in 1993. The SAHRC is one of the four countries 
which represent the African region in the ICC. It is therefore part of an international entity 
which provides leadership in the promotion and protection of human rights. The qualified to 
be in such a global position because it is not only established according to the Paris Principles 
but continues to practically uphold them. South Africa’s experience can be very useful as a 
benchmark for Botswana in its process of establishing a NHRI.  
On the other hand, the ZHRC is chosen as a case study because although its enabling 
legislation is compliant with the Paris principles, full operationalization of the commission is 
still pending mainly due to lack of compliance with the Paris Principles on financial 
independence. There is lack of political will on the part of the government of Zimbabwe to 
fund it sufficiently or at least cooperate with financial donors. Thus, the ZHRC provides a 
lesson to Botswana that financial independence which is dependent on political will is 
paramount in the effective establishment of a NHRI. 
 
1.4.  Significance of the study 
This dissertation acknowledges that advocacy for the establishment of a NHRI in Botswana 
has sufficiently been made. The government of Botswana has been fully convinced that 
indeed there is a need to establish a NHRI and has taken a step towards establishing one. This 
is evidenced by the advertisement of the post of Deputy Permanent Secretary whose mandate 
is to facilitate the creation of a NHRI.18 This development informs the focus of this 
dissertation. The development presents an opportunity to evaluate the process of establishing 
a NHRI which is compliant to the guidelines for establishing effective NHRIs-the Paris 
                                                          
18 Minister of Justice, Defence and Security ‘Vacancy Circular No 9 of 2013’, available at  
    http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-Of-Defence-Justice-and-Security1/Public-   
   Notices--Press-Releases/VACANCY-CIRCULAR-NO-9-OF-2013/, accessed on 15 January 2013. 
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Principles. The use of the SAHRC and the ZHRC as case studies will provide practical 
guidance to Botswana on how to establish a NHRI which is compliant to the Paris Principles.  
 
1.5.  Literature review 
In his article titled ‘The Constitutional Protection against Discrimination in Botswana’, 19 
Fombad has highlighted the shortcomings of legal remedies in the context of discrimination 
in Botswana hence advocating for the establishment of a NHRI to make up for these 
limitations. In another article titled ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Botswana: An 
Overview of the Regulatory Framework’,20 Fombad emphasises that a  NHRI is absolutely 
critical for the promotion and protection of human rights by ensuring that people get redress 
in the face of injustice, managing some of the policy implications of different interpretations 
of the Bill of rights in a programmatic manner without necessarily litigating those rights, as 
well as discharging promotional and advisory functions.21   These two articles do not discuss 
the concept of NHRIs; neither do they discuss the Paris Principles at all. They mention the 
establishment of a NHRI briefly, recommending it as a solution to discrimination and to the 
inadequacy of human rights protection identified in Botswana’s regulatory framework.  
Dinokopila wrote an article titled ‘Bringing the Paris Principles Home: Towards the 
Establishment of a National Human Rights Commission in Botswana’.22 Over and above 
studying how sufficient Botswana’s legal Framework protects human rights, the article 
assesses adherence of Botswana’s human rights protection institutions to the Paris Principles. 
It comes to the conclusion that both the legal and institutional framework inadequately 
protect human rights and that there is no institution that has been established according to the 
Paris Principles in Botswana. Consequently, the article calls for the establishment of a NHRI 
in Botswana.  
Dinokopila’s article is one of the many works which are acknowledged for the 
successful advocacy of the establishment of a NHRI in Botswana.  However, it was authored 
at a time when the government of Botswana, save having accepted recommendations to 
establish a NHRI in 2008, had not taken any step or put arrangements in place locally 
                                                          
19 Op cit (n5). 
20 Op cit (n6). 
21 Ibid at page 29. 
22 Op cit (n8). 
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towards the establishment of a NHRI.  This dissertation is however authored at a time when 
the Botswana government has advertised the post of Deputy Permanent Secretary under the 
Ministry Defence, Justice and Security to facilitate the establishment of a NHRI.23 This 
development has presented an opportunity to write about the process of establishing a NHRI 
which is the focus of this dissertation.   
To make this dissertation original and to extend on existing writings about the 
establishment of a NHRI in Botswana, the SAHRC and the ZHRC are used as case studies to 
provide practical guidance on the establishment of a NHRI which is compliant to the Paris 
Principles. Currently no research work has been conducted using this approach in or about 
Botswana. The dissertation is not only properly timed but it is an original concept that 
extends on the existing work related to NHRIs and the Paris Principles in Botswana. 
 
1.6.  Dissertation structure 
This dissertation has 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces this study while chapter 2 discusses the 
concept of NHRIs and the Paris Principles. Chapter 3 and 4 discusses the SAHRC and the 
ZHRC respectively. Emphasis is placed on evaluating whether legislation establishing these 
institutions and the manner in which these institutions execute their functions comply with 
the Paris Principles. Botswana’s legal and institutional framework is discussed in Chapter 5 
in order to identify gaps which will be filled by the establishment of a NHRI. Lessons learnt 
from the SAHRC and the ZHRC respectively are also discussed in chapter 5. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn from the whole study in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Op cit (n18). 
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND THE PARIS                                 
PRINCIPLES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The mandate of the United Nations (UN) includes the achievement of international 
cooperation in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.24 The UN 
formulates treaties which establish international human rights standards which all states must 
implement to ensure respect for human rights within their territories. Although the UN has 
established monitoring bodies, it is not able to monitor and ensure the implementation of 
treaties in all nations around the world. In that regard, it is assisted by regional human rights 
mechanisms. These exist in America, Africa, Europe and Asia primarily to mainstream 
human rights standards contained in UN treaties into the regional context. 
Over the years, it has become apparent that the mere fact that states have ratified 
treaties and incorporated them into their domestic laws or undertaken to comply in other 
ways is not enough. It has become apparent that it is necessary to establish national 
institutions which will ensure the full implementation of these treaties. The establishment of 
NHRIs is therefore a way in which governments ensure implementation of international 
human rights standards in their territories. NHRIs are mechanisms through which the UN and 
regional human rights systems achieve international cooperation in human rights protection. 
This chapter defines NHRIs, describes how they evolved and finally discusses the Paris 
Principles which are internationally recognised standards with which NHRIs must comply in 
order to function effectively. 
 
  2.2. Definition of national human rights institutions 
There is not yet an agreed definition of the term ‘NHRI’.25 Initially, the term was initially 
applied to any national institution with direct or indirect impact on the promotion and 
                                                          
24 Article 1, United Nations Charter, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ , accessed on 01  
    August 2014. 
25 United Nations Publication ‘National Human Rights Institutions: A handbook on the Establishment and   
    Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ (2005), page 6,  
    available at http://www.unrol.org/files/training4en.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2014. 
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protection of human rights. With the passage of time, this definition has been narrowed 
down to exclude some institutions which are not legislatively mandated to deal with human 
rights issues.  
Despite these refinements, the concept of NHRIs is not yet fully evolved. Efforts are 
however being made to define this term. NHRIs have been defined as institutions with a 
constitutional and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights. 26 Another 
definition which has been given is that NHRIs are state bodies with constitutional and/or 
legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights.27 Finally, it has been stated that 
NHRIs are bodies which are established by a government under the constitution or by law 
or by decree, the functions of which are specifically defined in terms of the promotion and 
protection of human rights.28  
From the definitions given, it is clear that NHRIs are institutions established by states 
through legislation with specific mandate to promote and protect human rights. Although 
there is not any single, universally accepted definition of NHRIs, they can be generally 
described as permanent and independent bodies which governments have established for the 
specific purpose of promoting and protecting human rights.29 
 
2.3. Evolution of national human rights institutions and of the Paris Principles 
The conception of NHRIs can be traced back to the Nuclear Commission on Human Rights 
meeting in 1946. A proposal from the meeting was that the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) should recommend the member states ‘… to establish information groups or local 
human rights committees within their countries who would transmit periodic information to 
the CHR on the observance of human rights in their countries both in their legal systems and 
                                                          
26 United Nations Publication ‘National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and  
    Responsibilities’ (2010), page 13, available at  
    http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1- NHRI_en.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2014. 
27 Ibid. 
28 National Human Rights Institutions: A handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National  
    Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, op cit (n25). 
29 A Pohjolainen ‘The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions -The Role of the United  
    Nations’ (2006), page 6. 
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their jurisdictional and administrative practice.’30 Following this recommendation of the 
Nuclear Commission on Human Rights, the ECOSOC invited member states to consider the 
desirability of establishing information groups or local human rights committees within their 
respective countries to collaborate with them in furthering the work of the CHR.31 
A series of resolutions relating to NHRIs followed, including ECOSOC Resolution 7b 
(XXX) of 25 July 196032 and ECOSOC Resolution 888F (XXXIV) of 24 July 1962.33 Both 
these resolutions invited governments to favour the formation of local human rights 
committees or national advisory committees.34 They invited governments to encourage the 
formation and continuation of such bodies as well as to communicate their ideas and 
information on the subject to the Secretary-General.35  
In 1977, the first ever opportunity to establish the functions of NHRIs presented itself. 
The UN Secretary General suggested that a seminar could be organised on the subject of 
NHRIs in 1978, bearing in mind the following possible functions of such institutions: acting 
as a source of relevant information regarding matters connected with human rights; assisting 
in the education towards an awareness and respect for human rights; considering, deliberating 
upon and making recommendations regarding any particular state of affairs that may exist 
nationally; advising the national government on any questions regarding human rights; 
studying and keeping under review the status of legislation, judicial decisions and 
administrative arrangements for the promotion of human rights and preparing and submitting 
periodic reports connected thereto; and performing any function which the government may 
                                                          
30 A Pohjolainen, op cit (n29), page 85. 
31 UN Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC Resolution 2/9, 21 June 1946, s 5 ‘Information   
    Groups’. 
32 UN Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC Resolution 772b (XXX), 25 July 1960, available at               
    http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/758/40/IMG/NR075840.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on 18    
    February 2014. 
33 UN Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC Resolution 888F (XXXIV), 24 July 1962, also available at      
    http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/758/40/IMG/NR075840.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on 18   
    February 2014. 
34 G Beco, ‘National Human Rights Institutions in Europe’ (2007), page 8. 
35 BG Ramchara (ed), Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration: Commemorative  
    Volume on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1979),    
    Page 27.      
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assign in connection with its duties under international conventions in the field of human 
rights to which it is a state party.36  
This was a giant leap in the history and evolution of NHRIs because it gave substance 
to the concept of NHRIs. It signified efforts to move away from an abstract definition of 
NHRIs as institutions whose business touches on human rights to any extent to a functional 
definition as an institution whose core mandate is human rights promotion and protection. 
The UN General Assembly accepted the proposal for a seminar on this topic and requested 
that the report of the seminar be forwarded to it for consideration.37  
In 1978, the Nuclear Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution in which it 
invited member states, within the framework of their national legislation and policy and 
according to their available means, to set up national institutions for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. It was recommended that such institutions should have such 
structures, composition and recommendatory or other powers as the government of the 
member state concerned may wish to give them, should bear in mind the legal, judicial, 
executive and other systems of the country as well as the goal of the realization and effective 
achievement of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.38  
The International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights which took place in Paris in 1991 presented itself as yet another significant 
milestone in the development of NHRIs. The significance of the workshop is that its outcome 
- the Paris Principles are to date regarded as the international minimum standards for NHRIs. 
The Paris Principles are broadly accepted as the test of an institution’s legitimacy and 
credibility and have become part of the human rights lexicon.39  
                                                          
36 Ramchara, op cit (n35), page 32.  
37 GA Resolution 32/123, 16 December 1977, available at     
    http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/32/123&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION, 
    accessed on 8 March 2014. 
38 Resolution 23 (XXXIV),13 December 1978, available at    
    http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1978/64.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2014. 
39 UNDP-OHCHR Tool kit for collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions (2010), page 10, available  
    at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-   
     governance/human_rights/NHRIsToolkit.html, accessed on 8 March 2014.  
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The year 1993 presented a critical turning point for NHRIs. NHRIs which are compliant to 
the Paris Principles were formally recognized as important and constructive actors in the 
promotion and protection of human rights at the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna.40 Thereat, the ICC was established, nullifying its predecessor, the Network of 
National Institutions which was established in Paris in 1991. The ICC is responsible for 
reviewing NHRIs on their compliance with the Paris Principles. It is also responsible for 
encouraging coordination and cooperation among NHRIs as well as to serve as liaison with 
the UN and other international organisations. 
 
2.4. The Paris Principles  
The Paris Principles are standards which all NHRIs should meet in order to function 
effectively. The principles are provided for under four main headings which are competence 
and responsibilities, composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, method of 
operation and additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi-
jurisdictional competence.  
 
2.4.1. Competence and responsibilities of national human rights institutions 
The Paris Principles require that NHRIs be given a mandate as broad as possible, which shall 
be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its sphere of 
competence.41 There are two main roles and responsibilities of NHRIs that are provided in 
the Paris Principles. These are human rights protection and human rights promotion.42 From 
these two main roles flow the following seven roles and responsibilities: advising government 
and any other competent bodies concerning the promotion and protection of human rights; 
promoting and ensuring the harmonization of national legislation and practices with 
international human rights practices; encouraging ratification, accession and implementation 
of  international human rights instruments; contributing to the reports which states are 
                                                          
40 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993 (A/CONF.157/23) part I, paragraph 36, 
    available at http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/pdf/VIENNA.PDF, accessed on 8  
    March 2014. 
41 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) competence and responsibilities, Article 2. 
42 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 1. 
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required to submit to the UN bodies and committees and to regional institutions; cooperating 
with the UN and any other organisation in and other NHRI; assisting in the formulation of 
programmes for the teaching and research into human rights and taking part in their 
execution; and publicising human rights through education and the press.43 
 NHRIs have a responsibility to advice government, parliament and any other 
competent bodies on human rights matters.44 Advice means to submit opinions 
recommendations, proposals and reports on existing legislation as well as proposed 
legislation to government, parliament and any other competent body to ensure compatibility 
with human rights norms.45  It also means making submissions to government, parliament 
and any other competent bodies about any specific matter on human rights.46  Drawing the 
attention of government, parliament and any other competent bodies to situations in any part 
of the country where human rights are violated and making proposals for redress also makes 
up advice which can be given by national human rights institutions. 47  NHRIs can perform 
this advisory role mero motu or at the request of government, parliament or any competent 
authority.48  
NHRIs also have the responsibility to promote and ensure the harmonization of 
national legislation and practices with international human rights practices.49 This includes 
advising the state on the incorporation of international human rights law into the domestic 
law. NHRIs are also mandated to encourage the state to ratify international human rights 
instruments and to ensure their effective implementation on the ground.50  
In addition, the Paris Principles require cooperation of NHRIs with regional 
institutions and the national institutions of other countries.51 The ICC is a product of this 
requirement. It was established and mandated to encourage coordination and cooperation 
among NHRIs as well as to serve as liaison with the UN and other international 
                                                          
43 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (a-g) 
44 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (a). 
45 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Article 3(a) (i). 
46 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (a) (ii). 
47 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (a) (iv). 
48 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (a) and Article 3 (a) (ii). 
49 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (b). 
50 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (c). 
51 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3(e). 
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organisations.52 The Paris Principles also require that NHRIs should cooperate with the UN 
and with organisations in the UN system.53 Examples of organisations within the UN are 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNCF), 
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNDFW), International Labour 
Organization (ILO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health 
Organization (WHO) and United Nations Population Fund (UNPF).  
Moreover, NHRIs have the responsibility to contribute to the reports54 which states 
are required to submit to the ten treaty Bodies, special procedures of the UNHRC and to the 
Review Universal Periodic (UPR). In addition, NHRIs have to ensure that the comments and 
recommendations issued by these bodies concerning their countries are considered and 
implemented. NHRIs also have the responsibility to publicize human rights and efforts to 
combat all forms of discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially through 
information and education and all press organs.55  Finally, NHRIs have the responsibility to 
develop and be involved in the implementation of educational human rights curriculum for 
schools, universities and professional cadres.56 
 
2.4.2. Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism 
The Paris Principles provide that the composition of a NHRI and the appointment of its 
members should be done through a process which ensures pluralism.57 Pluralism refers to the 
representation of the social stakeholders involved in the promotion and protection of human 
rights. For example, professional organisations such as associations of lawyers, journalists, 
                                                          
52 ICC Statute, section 5 ‘Purpose’ available at                    
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Governance/Statute/ICC%20Statute%20as%20amended%20at%20ICC%202   
5.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2014. 
53 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n 51). 
54 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n 3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (d). 
55 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (g). 
56 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Competence and responsibilities, Article 3 (f). 
57 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 1. 
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scientists and doctors,58  philosophical or religious organisations,59 universities and qualified 
experts60 parliament61 and government departments provided that their participation is 
advisory only.62 Pluralism enhances a NHRI’s independence, credibility and effectiveness.63  
NHRIs are established by states. As a result, they depend on state funding and report 
their performance to state ministers or parliament through annual reports. Despite these 
factors, NHRIs are required to be independent. Four factors are used to gauge the 
independence of NHRIs and these are: legal independence, operational independence, 
financial independence and independence through appointment and dismissal procedures.64  
NHRIs are required to have operational independence, that is, to run their daily 
activities without state interference. The laws establishing NHRIs are required to give NHRIs 
a distinct legal personality. This is called legal independence which can be achieved by not 
making NHRIs departments under any ministry of government. Legal independence can also 
be achieved by making NHRIs to report directly to parliament or to the president without 
going through any ministry.65  
The Paris Principles further require NHRIs to have financial independence.66  State 
funding should be sufficient for NHRIs to be able to employ independent staff as well as to 
secure separate premises.67 It is desirable that NHRIs should draw up their own budgets, that 
their budgets be separated from any department’s budget, that they have authority to defend 
budget requests directly before parliament and finally that their budgets be secure and not 
                                                          
58 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 1 (a). 
59 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 1(b). 
60 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 1 (c). 
61 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 1 (d).  
62 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 1 (e). 
63 UNDP-OHCHR Tool kit for collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions op cit (n39), 252. 
64 National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, op cit. (n26), page 40. 
65 National Human Rights Institutions: A handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National  
    Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, op cit (n25), page 40. 
66 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Principles on Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism,  
    Article 2.  
67 Ibid.  
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subject to arbitrary reduction within the year that the budget is approved and also from one 
year to the next.68 
The independence of NHRIs can also be determined through their appointment and 
dismissal processes. The Paris Principles provide that the appointment of the members of a 
NHRI should be effected by an official act which shall establish the duration of the 
appointment and the possibility of renewal of the appointment.69 The appointment process of 
a NHRI has a bearing on its independence since a stable mandate is a precondition for 
independence.70 Dismissal procedures also have a bearing on NHRIs’ independence.71 NHRIs 
will therefore be regarded as independent if their appointment and dismissal processes are 
legislated and involve parliament or an autonomous body such as a panel of judges.72 
 
 2.4.3. Methods of operation 
The Paris Principles provide that in their operations, NHRIs shall freely consider any 
question falling within their competence;73 hear any person and obtain any information 
necessary to assess situations within their jurisdiction;74 address the public directly or through 
the media;75 hold regular members’ meetings;76 establish working groups and local or 
regional sections to help in the performance of their functions;77  maintain consultations with 
other bodies whose mandate is to promote and protect human rights such as ombudsmen and 
                                                          
68 National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, op cit (n39), pages 40- 
    41. 
69 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Article 3. 
70 National Human Rights Institutions: A handbook on the Establishment and   
    Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, op cit (n25), page  
    42. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (a). 
74 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (b). 
75 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (c). 
76 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (d). 
77 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (e). 
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mediators;78 and develop relations to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) devoted to 
promoting and protecting human rights.79 
 
2.4.4. Additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi-
jurisdictional competence 
NHRIs may be authorised to hear and consider complaints concerning alleged individual 
human right violations.80 NHRIs are competent to receive complaints brought to them by 
individuals, their representatives, third parties and NGOs, trade unions or any other 
representative organisation.81  
Following receipt of complaints, NHRIs can amicably settle the complaint through 
conciliation or make binding decisions or on the basis of confidential interventions.82 NHRIs 
may also inform complainants of their rights, and of remedies available to them.83 They are 
authorised to refer complaints to competent authorities84 and finally, NHRIs may make 
recommendations to competent authorities to propose law reforms or administrative practices 
especially if they perpetrated prejudice on complainants in the course of asserting their 
rights.85 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (f). 
79 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3) Methods of operation, Article (g). 
80 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3), Additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi- 
    jurisdictional competence. 
81 Ibid. 
82 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3), Additional Principles Concerning the Status of Commissions with quasi- 
    jurisdictional competence, Article (a).  
83 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3), Additional Principles Concerning the Status of Commissions with quasi- 
    jurisdictional competence, Article (b). 
84 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3), Additional Principles Concerning the Status of Commissions with quasi- 
    jurisdictional competence, Article (c). 
85 A/Res 48/134 op cit (n3), Additional Principles Concerning the Status of Commissions with quasi- 
    jurisdictional competence, Article (d).   
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 2.5. Conclusion 
NHRIs are entities established by states through legislation with specific mandate to 
promote and protect human rights. They form part of the many mechanisms used by the UN 
to achieve international cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights. 
NHRIs are regarded as credible and effective only if they are established and function 
according to the Paris Principles-a set of principles established through a UN resolution to 
guide states in setting up effectively functioning NHRIs.  
The Paris Principles require NHRIs to advise government on matters concerning the 
promotion and protection of human rights, promote and ensure the harmonization of 
national laws with international human rights instruments, encourage ratification of 
international human rights instruments and ensure their implementation, contribute to the 
reports which Botswana is required to submit to the UN bodies, cooperate with UN, 
regional and other national institutions that are involved in the promotion and protection of 
human rights, research and formulate human rights education curriculum and publicize 
human rights through information and education. (Op cit n43).  
In addition, national laws establishing NHRIs must guarantee pluralism and 
independence of those institutions. Finally, the national laws must legislate for regular 
meetings of NHRIs and commissions of the committee specialising on thematic areas of 
human rights. By complying with the Paris Principles in their establishment and execution 
of duties, NHRIs assist states to comply with their human rights protection and protection 
obligations. The end result is the observance or respect of human rights by the international 
community. 
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CHAPTER 3: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the scope of rights recognized and protected, the enforcement 
measures and institutions that support effective human rights protection in South Africa. 
Focus will specifically be placed on the SAHRC. Legislation establishing this institution will 
be examined for compliance with the Paris Principles. Also subject to examination in this 
chapter is the impact of the SAHRC’s achievements and constraints on its compliance with 
the Paris Principles. A comparative approach is employed to identify the best practices which 
Botswana can use as a benchmark in establishing its NHRI.  
 
3.2. Legal Framework 
The Constitution of South Africa86 provides the legal framework for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. The Bill of rights under chapter 2 in the Constitution of South 
Africa is one of the most progressive in the world as it guarantees civil and political rights as 
well social, economic and cultural rights.  The civil rights and political rights guaranteed in 
South African Bill of rights include: the right to equality;87  the right to human dignity;88 the 
right to life;89  the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion;90  the right to freedom of 
expression;91 children’s’ rights;92 the right of access to information;93 and the rights of 
arrested, detained and accused persons.94 The socio-economic rights recognised and protected 
by the South African Bill of Rights include the right to have access to adequate housing;95 the 
                                                          
86 Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996). 
87 Constitution of South Africa s 9.  
88 Constitution of South Africa s 10. 
89 Constitution of South Africa s 11. 
90 Constitution of South Africa s 15.  
91 Constitution of South Africa s 16. 
92 Constitution of South Africa s 28. 
93 Constitution of South Africa s 32. 
94 Constitution of South Africa s 35. 
95 Constitution of South Africa s 26. 
20 
 
 
right to have access to health care, food, water and social security;96 and the right to 
education.97 The cultural rights recognised and protected in the South African Bill of Rights 
are the right to language and culture98  and the right to belong to cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities.99  Any other rights that are conferred by common law, customary law 
or legislation can only be recognised as long as they are consistent with the Bill of Rights.100  
International law also plays an important role in the protection of human rights in 
South Africa.  There are ten core international human rights instruments (9 human rights 
treaties and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on Against Torture (CAT)) and some of 
these instruments are supplemented by optional protocols dealing with specific concerns.101 
South Africa is a party to 6 of these core international human rights protection instruments.102 
South Africa is also a party to the following African Regional Conventions: African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter); Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights; and African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.103  
The Constitution of South Africa mandates the Courts of South Africa to consider not 
only the international and regional human rights treaties which South Africa is a party to, but 
                                                          
96 Constitution of South Africa s 27. 
97 Constitution of South Africa s 29. 
98 Constitution of South Africa s 30. 
99 Constitution of South Africa s 31. 
100 Constitution of South Africa s 39 (3). 
101 These are: ICERD;   ICCPR; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);    
    Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); Convention  
    against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); CRC;  
    International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their  
    Families; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and  
    Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. See    
    http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx, accessed on 9 April 2014.  
102 See the University of Minnesota Human rights library generally on South Africa’s treaty ratification status,        
     available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-southafrica.html, accessed on 3 April  
     2014. 
103  Ibid. 
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international law in general when interpreting the Bill of Rights.104 The influence of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is evident in the economic, social and cultural 
rights and the children’s rights included in the Bill of Rights.105  In addition, section 31 of the 
South African Constitution was modelled on article 27 of the ICCPR.106 It can therefore be 
said that the South African Constitution adequately promotes and protects human rights as it 
holistically contains almost all universally recognised human rights and as it is substantially 
influenced by international law. 
 
3.3. Institutional Framework  
The Constitution of South Africa gives the Court the mandate to enforce the Bill of Rights.107 
The Constitution sets up the structure of the South African judiciary which includes the 
Constitutional Court;108 the Supreme Court of Appeal;109 the High Courts;110 the Magistrates’ 
Courts;111 and any other courts established through an Act of Parliament.112 The 
Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters in South Africa.113 It was 
established as a specialised court to deal exclusively with constitutional issues.114 It is the 
only court whose decision on the constitutionality of matters is final.115 The High Court and 
all other Courts cannot make final orders of constitutional invalidity. The Constitution 
requires them to grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party, or may 
                                                          
104 Constitution of South Africa s 139 (2). 
105 S Lienberg ‘Human development and human rights: South African Country Study’ Human    
    Development Report (2000), page 17, available at  
    http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/sandra_liebenberg.pdf, accessed on 7 April 2013. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Constitution of South Africa s 38 (1). 
108 Constitution of South Africa s 166 (a). 
109 Constitution of South Africa s 166 (b). 
110 Constitution of South Africa s 166 (c). 
111 Constitution of South Africa s 166 (d). 
112 Constitution of South Africa s 166 (e). 
113 Constitution of South Africa s 167 (3) (a). 
114 Constitution of South Africa s 167 (3) (b). 
115 Constitution of South Africa s 167 (3) (c). 
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adjourn the proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity of that 
Act or conduct.116  
The Courts of South Africa continue to play an important role in the protection of human 
rights in South Africa.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to critically discuss all the 
fundamental human rights cases adjudicated upon by the Courts of South Africa. However a 
few select rights are worth mentioning. The Courts of South Africa have adjudicated on 
matters concerning the right to equality;117 the right to life;118 freedom of expression;119the 
rights of arrested, detained and accused persons;120 the right to human dignity;121 political 
rights;122 the right to health;123 the right to adequate housing;124 the right to education;125 and 
the right to water.126 
Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution establishes institutions that support 
constitutional democracy as well as promote and give substance to the rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution.  These are the Public Protector;127 the SAHRC;128 the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities;129 
                                                          
116 Constitution of South Africa s 172 (2) (b). 
117 See Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4)    
     SA 1 (CC), and Moseneke v Master of the High Court 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC). 
118 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) and Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister   
     of Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T). 
119 See Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W), Government of the Republic of South Africa v  
     The Sunday Times Newspaper 1995 (2) SA 221 (T) and Case v Minister of safety and Security, Curtis v  
     Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC). 
120 See S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC), S v Agnew 1996 (2) SACR 535, Msila v Government of South Africa  
     1996 (1) SARB 365 (SE) and Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441 (C). 
121 See S. v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 
122 See August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
123 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) and Minister of Health  v  
     Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC). 
124 See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 
125 See Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School  v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO &  
     2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). 
126 See Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
127 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (1) (a). 
128 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (1) (b). 
129 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (1) (c). 
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the Commission for Gender Equality;130 the Auditor-General;131 and the Electoral 
Commission.132 The Civil Society deserves to be mentioned among institutions that continue 
to be vital in the promotion and protection of human rights in South Africa.  
Although these institutions individually and collectively play a role in the promotion 
and protection of human rights, this chapter will focus only on the SAHRC. Particular 
emphasis is placed on examining compliance of the SAHRC with the Paris Principles based 
on the constitutional and other legislative provisions establishing it as well as on its selected 
achievements and constraints.   
 
3.3.1. The South African Human Rights Commission and the Paris Principles 
The SAHRC complies with the Paris Principle on legal independence. The commission is 
established under section 181 (1) (b) of the Constitution as an independent institution, subject 
only to the Constitution and the law.133 The Constitution requires it to be impartial and to 
exercise its powers and perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.134 The 
SAHRC Act135 which is national legislation enacted to give effect to section 184 (4) of the 
Constitution emphasises the independence and impartiality of the SAHRC. Section 184 (4) of 
the Constitution provides for the enactment of national legislation to provide for additional 
functions and powers of the SAHRC.  
The commissioners and members of staff are required to serve impartially and 
independently and to perform their functions in good faith and without fear, favour, bias or 
prejudice and subject only to the constitution and the law.136 The commissioners and 
members of staff are further required to act in a manner that will promote the credibility, 
                                                          
130 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (1) (d). 
131 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (1) (e). 
132 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (1) (f). 
133 Constitution of South Africa s 181 (2). 
134 Ibid. 
135 South African Human Rights Commission Act (Act No 40 of 2013). 
136 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 4 (1) (a). 
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impartiality, integrity and independence of the SAHRC. 137 They are required to declare 
conflict of interest; failing which the SAHRC is mandated to investigate their actions.138  
The SAHRC also complies with the Paris Principles because it is vested with the 
mandate to promote and protect human rights which is clearly set out in the Constitution and 
the SAHRC Act. The establishment of the SAHRC was an integral part of South Africa’s 
paradigm shift from the apartheid legacy to a new constitutional order based on respect and 
protection of human rights.139 The SAHRC was therefore established as part of a democratic 
system aimed at ensuring that the appalling human rights abuses of South Africa’s past could 
not be repeated. Its overarching functions are to promote respect for human rights and a 
culture of human rights,140 to promote the protection, development and attainment of human 
rights;141 and to monitor and assess the observance of human rights in South Africa.142  
In addition, the SAHRC complies with the Paris Principles on independence based on 
appointment and dismissal procedures. The appointment of its members is established in the 
Constitution and in the SAHRC Act. The two Acts of Parliament disclose the eligibility 
criteria143 upon which the president appoints the commissioners,144 the chairperson and the 
vice chairperson of the SAHRC.145 The National Assembly has authority to decide whether 
commissioners can serve as on part time or full time basis and to fix the tenure of their office 
which shall not exceed seven years.146 The SAHRC Act further prescribes the powers and 
functions of the chairperson, the deputy chairperson and the commissioners,147 re-
                                                          
137 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 4 (1) (c). 
138 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 4 (4) and section 4 (5). 
139 J Matshekga ‘Toothless Bulldogs? The Human Rights Commissions of Uganda and South Africa: A   
     Comparative Study of their independence’ African Human Rights Law Journal 68, page 69. 
140 Constitution of South Africa s 184 (1) (a) and South African Human Rights Commission Act s 2 (a).  
141 Constitution of South Africa s 184 (1) (b) and South African Human Rights Commission Act s section 2 (b).  
142 Constitution of South Africa s 184 (1) (c) and South African Human Rights Commission Act s 2 (c). 
143 Constitution of South Africa s 193 (1) and South African Human Rights Commission Act s 5 (1) (b). 
144 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 5(1) (iv) 
145 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 6 (1). 
146 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 5 (2). 
147 South African Human Rights Commission Act s 7. 
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appointment procedures,148 resignation procedures,149 remuneration and allowances of 
commissioners,150 grounds and procedures of removal from office.151 
 The SAHRC further complies with the Paris Principles on operational independence. 
The provisions of the SAHRC Act give the commission freedom to determine how it runs its 
day to day activities. The SAHRC appoints its chief executive officer152 who in turn as the 
head of administration appoints the staff153 of the commission to help it with its performance 
of its financial, administrative and clerical functions. As the head of administration, the Chief 
Executive Officer is responsible for management of the affairs and operations of the 
SAHRC,154 gets instructions about the performance of his duties and exercise of his/her 
powers only from the commission155 to which he/she exclusively reports.156 
The placement of the SAHRC’s budget under the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development negatively impacts on its compliance with the Paris Principles 
on financial independence. The SAHRC has raised concerns about this arrangement and 
requested that its budget should fall under Parliament’s budget vote, as opposed to that of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.157 The SAHRC’s other concern is 
that its budget is not sufficient to enable it to carry out its functions effectively. In 2012, 
when the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development approached 
Parliament to discuss the issue of National Treasury’s refusal to increase the budget of the 
SAHRC, it revealed that with insufficient funds, the commission could not outreach out to the 
remote rural areas in the provinces, had to use pro bono attorneys as it did not have the funds 
for to litigation, could not conduct awareness clinics to inform the public about its role and 
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operations and its commissioners could not travel to fulfil their duties. 158  These issues 
hamper the SAHRC from addressing human rights effectively. Inadequate funding has also 
affected the SAHRC’s ability to effectively carry out its constitutional mandate to monitor 
socio-economic rights, which is its critical mandate.159 As a result it has relied on donor 
funding for the socio-economic rights reporting process. 160 
The SAHRC advises the government of South Africa on the implementation of and 
compliance with international and regional law.161 This is in compliance with the Paris 
Principles. This function goes towards promoting and ensuring the harmonization of national 
legislation with international human rights instruments to which South Africa is a party to as 
well as encouraging ratification of such instruments. The Commission reports that it has 
made submissions on legislation relating to torture, traditional courts, protection of 
information, and older persons and that these submissions have resulted in the adoption of 
legislation which complies with international human rights norms and standards.162 The 
SAHRC has also recommended that the South African government should consider ratifying 
the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers, the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to CAT 
and the ICESCR.163 
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The SAHRC also complies with the Paris Principles as it contributes to the reports which 
South Africa is required to submit to the UN bodies and committees. The SAHRC Act 
mandates the commission to require relevant organs of state to provide it yearly with 
information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the 
environment.164 Through this function, the SAHRC is also able to review government 
policies relating to human rights as required by the SAHRC Act.165 Following due 
consideration of the reports and policies submitted by organs of departments, the SAHRC has 
the responsibility to recommend the relevant organs of state to take measures to ensure the 
promotion and protection of human rights within the framework of the Constitution and the 
law.166  
In addition to socio-economic rights reports, the SAHRC produces annual 
international reports setting out the international treaty bodies monitored by the commission 
and providing information on the South African situation and developments in relation to a 
particular treaty on an annual basis. The SAHRC also prepares and submits reports to the 
National Assembly pertaining to international or regional law.167 The Commission also has to 
produces an annual Equality Report touching on issues such as racism, disability and laws 
affecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights.168 Finally, the commission is 
accountable to the National Assembly to which it reports its activities and the performance of 
its functions once a year.169 
The SAHRC compiles these reports through its research programme. The SAHRC 
Act mandates the commission to carry out research170 and to undertake studies for reporting 
on or relating to human rights.171 By carrying out research, the commission complies with the 
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Paris Principles. In addition to research, the SAHRC complies with the Paris Principles 
because the SAHRC Act empowers it to develop, conduct or manage information 
programmes and education programmes to foster public understanding of the Bill of Rights 
and of its activities.172 In October 2002 the SAHRC collaborated with the National 
Department of Education to ensure that human rights form part of the mandatory school 
curriculum.173  
Connected with the responsibility to develop education programmes in schools and 
universities, the SAHRC has the responsibility to educate174 and to develop an awareness of 
human rights among all the people of South Africa. The commission has ensured that human 
rights education spreads throughout South Africa through its outreach and community 
visits.175 It has also conducted joint public education campaigns with the Public Protector, an 
example among many of such reported in the media being the one held in Kimberley on 
Human Rights Day in 2009 where South Africans were urged to use Chapter 9 institutions to 
protect their rights.176  
The SAHRC further complies with the Paris Principles on pluralism and methods of 
operation. The Constitution mandates the commission to consider race and gender in the 
appointment of its members.177  This ensures pluralism. The SAHRC Act also legislates for 
pluralism as it mandates the SAHRC to liaise and interact with any organisation which 
actively promotes respect for human rights and other sectors of civil society to further the 
objectives of the commission.178In addition, the SAHRC Act mandates the SAHRC to 
maintain close liaison with institutions, bodies and authorities with similar objectives in order 
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to foster common policies and practices and to promote cooperation in relation to the 
handling of cases of overlapping jurisdiction.179  
The commission reports that it has used public inquiries not only as a mechanism for 
public education and public accountability but also as  tools that advance non-adversarial 
dialogue between the state, academics, civil society and the citizens of South Africa. Public 
inquiries conducted by the SAHRC so far include the rights of farm workers, access to basic 
education, access to health care services, violence in schools, housing and evictions, hearings 
on the Millennium Development Goals, boom gates and closed communities, and the rights 
of the Khomani San Community.180 Networking with these NGOs also satisfies the Paris 
Principles on methods of operation. In this regard, the commission reports that it has enjoyed 
great recognition outside South Africa by working closely with structures such as the UNDP, 
UNHCR, HCHR and the Commonwealth as partner in joint projects and as expert resource to 
new national institutions.181  
Finally, the SAHRC has quasi-jurisdictional competence. It is empowered by the 
Constitution to investigate actual or threatened human rights violations.182 The SAHRC Act 
details the investigation process to be followed183 and gives the commission wide 
investigative powers such as to enter and search the premises and attach and remove 
articles.184 After due investigation, if the Commission is of the opinion that there is substance 
in any complaint made to it, it is empowered take steps to secure appropriate redress where 
human rights have been violated.185 Appropriate redress might involve arranging for or 
providing ﬁnancial assistance to enable proceedings to be taken to a competent court for the 
necessary relief or directing a complainant to an appropriate forum.186 The commission is 
expressly mandated to resolve any dispute or rectify ant act or omission by mediation, 
conciliation or negotiation.187 
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3.4. Conclusion 
The South African Constitution adequately promotes and protects human rights as it 
holistically contains almost all universally recognised human rights and as it is substantially 
influenced by international human rights law. In addition, although South Africa is not party 
to all the ten core human rights protection instruments, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of 
South Africa mandates the Courts to consider international law in the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights. This makes it possible for international law to be used to fill the gap left by 
national legislation in the promotion of human rights in South Africa. In essence, 
international law extends the scope of the protection of human rights in South Africa leading 
to a conclusion that the legal framework in South Africa adequately protects human rights. 
 The Courts of South Africa, particularly the Constitutional Court continue to play a 
role in the protection of the fundamental human rights which are guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights in the South African Constitution. In addition to the Courts, the Constitution of South 
Africa has established independent institutions which have come to be known as Chapter 9 
institutions to safeguard democracy and human rights. It has been stated that South Africa is 
the only country in the world where the Constitution establishes such a large number of 
different institutions to support constitutional democracy and to monitor, protect and promote 
human rights.188 One of these institutions is the SAHRC.  
The legislative provisions establishing the SAHRC comply with the Paris Principles. 
The practices of the commission also comply with the Paris Principles save the placement of 
the institution under the Justice Ministry which compromises its financial independence. The 
SAHRC has been accredited as an ‘A status’ NHRI by the ICC since 1999. It has been 
certified that it complies with the Paris Principles and is found to continue to do so at every 
review. It sits in the ICC Bureau consisting of 16 ‘A status’ NHRIs representing the four 
regions of the ICC.  Other regions are Americas, Asia Pacific and Europe.  This means that it 
provides leadership in the promotion and protection of human rights globally.  
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CHAPTER 4: A CASE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE  
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the scope of rights recognized and protected, the enforcement 
measures and institutions that support effective human rights protection in Zimbabwe. Focus 
will be placed on the ZHRC. Legislation establishing this institution will be examined for 
compliance with the Paris Principles. Also subject to examination in this chapter is the impact 
of the ZHRC’s achievements and constraints on its compliance with the Paris Principles. A 
comparative approach is employed to identify the best practices which Botswana can use as a 
benchmark in establishing its NHRI. 
 
4.2. Legal framework  
In 2013, Zimbabwe repealed its independence Constitution adopted in 1980. The 1980 
Constitution recognised and protected civil and political rights only. The current 
Constitution189 considerably improves upon its predecessor as it contains a comprehensive 
list of rights which one would expect in a liberal democracy.190 The Constitution of 
Zimbabwe protects civil and political rights as well as socio-economic and cultural rights. It 
joins the South African and Kenyan Constitutions in being one of the few African national 
constitutions which expressly provides for the judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights.191  
The Bill of rights in the Constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees political rights such as 
the right to life;192 the rights of arrested and detained persons;193 the right to human 
                                                          
189 Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment no 20/2013). 
190 D Matyszak ‘Human Rights and Zimbabwe’s Draft Constitution’ Research and advocacy Unit ( March   
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dignity;194 freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;195 
the right to equality and non-discrimination;196 freedom of expression and freedom of the 
media;197 the right of access to information;198 political rights; 199 and the rights of accused 
persons.200 Cultural rights, particularly the right to language and culture are also recognised 
and protected in the Constitution of Zimbabwe.201  Moreover, the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
recognises and protects social and economic rights such as the right to education;202 the right 
to health care;203 and the right to food and water.204 The rights and freedoms applicable only 
to particular classes of people such as women;205 children;206 the elderly;207 and persons with 
disabilities208 are also recognised and protected in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Finally, the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises and protects any other rights and freedoms conferred 
by law, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill of Rights.209  
The only criticism levelled against the Constitution of Zimbabwe relates to the 
provision on rights to agricultural land (section 72). This provision ousts the jurisdiction of 
courts to adjudicate on any judicial challenges on the acquisition or compensation payable in 
respect of acquisition of agricultural land. This has been seen as unconstitutional as it 
excludes judicial scrutiny whose function is to curtail any potential abuses of public 
power.210   
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International law is useful in interpreting the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe. The Courts and other competent bodies are required to take into account 
international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party.211 Zimbabwe 
is party to 5 of the 10 core international human rights instruments212 being ICCPR; CEDAW; 
ICERD; ICESCR; and CRC. Zimbabwe is also party to the African Charter; Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; 
Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa; and African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child.213  
The UNDP has recommended that in seeking to build national capacity to promote, 
protect, respect and fulfil human rights, Zimbabwe should ratify relevant international 
instruments and optional protocols, including the: CAT; Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities; Convention on the Rights of the Child optional protocols on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography and on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict; Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons especially 
women and children; and Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers 
and members of their families.214 The Constitution of Zimbabwe requires the state to ensure 
that all international conventions, treaties and agreements to which Zimbabwe is a party are 
incorporated into domestic law.215 
 
4.3. Institutional framework  
The Courts of Zimbabwe play an important role in the protection of human rights in 
Zimbabwe. They are vested with authority to enforce the rights contained in the Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Any person acting in their own interests;216 acting on behalf 
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of another person who cannot act for themselves;217 acting as a member, or in the interests, of 
a group or class of persons;218 acting in the public interest;219 or any association acting in the 
interests of its members;220 is entitled to approach a court in the event that of actual or 
threatened violation of human rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 
  The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters whose 
decisions on those matters bind all other courts.221 The Supreme Court which is established 
by section 162 (b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe does not have any jurisdiction over 
constitutional matters, either as a court of first instance or as a court of appeal.222 Section 162 
(c) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe establishes the High Court and empowers it to decide 
constitutional matters except those that only the Constitutional Court may decide.223 Finally, 
other Courts which are established in terms of section 174 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
may decide on constitutional matters within their jurisdiction.224 They may also refer any 
constitutional matter that arises during their proceedings to the Constitutional Court225 and 
where they make an order concerning the constitutional invalidity of any law or any conduct 
of the president or parliament, they have to refer the order for confirmation to the 
Constitutional Court. Until such orders are confirmed by the Constitutional Court, they have 
no force.226  
At the time that other courts make an order of constitutional invalidity, they may also 
grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the 
proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the matter.227 Any person with 
locus standi may appeal, or apply, directly to the Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an 
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order concerning constitutional validity by any court.228After adjudicating on a constitutional 
matter, the courts shall make any order that is just and equitable including a declaration of 
rights and an award of compensation;229 declaring that any law or conduct that is inconsistent 
with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency,230 making an order limiting 
the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity and/or make an order suspending 
conditionally or unconditionally the declaration of invalidity for any period to allow the 
competent authority to correct the defect.231  
In addition to the Courts, the Constitution of Zimbabwe establishes independent 
institutions under chapter 12.  These institutions are mandated inter alia to support and 
entrench human rights and democracy.232 These are the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission;233 
the ZHRC;234 the Zimbabwe Gender Commission;235 the Zimbabwe Media Commission;236 
and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.237 The civil society is also actively 
involved in human rights promotion and protection in Zimbabwe.  
Although these institutions individually and collectively play a role in the promotion 
and protection of human rights, this chapter will focus only on the ZHRC. Particular 
emphasis is placed on examining compliance of the ZHRC with the Paris Principles based on 
the constitutional and other legislative provisions establishing it as well as on its practical 
experiences. A comparative analysis in this regard is important for Botswana to note possible 
challenges which it is likely to face in establishing its NHRI. 
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4.3.1. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Paris Principles 
Sections 107 and 108 of the 1980 Constitution of Zimbabwe established the office of the 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1982 was passed to give effect to these constitutional 
provisions, particularly prescribing the appointment, powers and functions of the 
Ombudsman. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 18) Act, 2007 repealed 
sections 107 and 108 of the 1980 Constitution of Zimbabwe and among other things, changed 
the name of the Ombudsman to Public Protector and prescribed the functions of the Public 
Protector.238   
Sections 108A and 108B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 18) Act, 
2007 were repealed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 19) Act, 2008.  The 
repeal of these sections effectively abolished the office of the Public Protector and 
established the ZHRC. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 
transfers the functions previously undertaken by the Public Protector to the ZHRC. 239 The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe then mandates the ZHRC to promote the protection, development 
and attainment of human rights and freedoms;240 and to monitor, assess and ensure 
observance of human rights and freedoms.241 The ZHRC is therefore a hybrid NHRI as it has 
a mandate to promote and protect human rights as well as to investigate maladministration. 
The motive for establishing the ZHRC was divulged in 2006 by the then Justice 
Minister Patrick Chinamasa when he announced that Zimbabwe will establish a NHRI as part 
of its ‘quest to create a culture of human rights.’242 The proposal for the formation of the 
ZHRC was celebrated for various reasons, inter alia that it will create a culture of human 
rights in the country;  it will go a long way in protecting the rights of all Zimbabweans; it will 
further consolidate the country’s democracy; it will show Zimbabwe’s commitment to 
upholding international conventions of human rights; it will serve as an indispensable 
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institution that would safeguard the soiling of Zimbabwe’s human rights profile by NGOs; 
and reduce the frequency of cases of alleged human rights abuses.243  
The ZHRC complies with the Paris Principles on legal independence. It is established 
through Acts of Parliament – the Constitution and the ZHRC Act244 as an independent 
institution which is not subject to the direction or control of anyone.245 The commission is a 
body corporate capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name and also capable of 
performing all acts that bodies corporate may by law perform.246 It is mandated to act in 
accordance with the Constitution247 and to exercise its functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice.248  
The ZHRC also meets the operational independence criteria required by the Paris 
Principles. Its commissioners and members of staff are required to serve impartially and 
independently and to exercise or perform their functions in good faith and without fear, 
favour, bias or prejudice and subject only to the Constitution and the law.249 They are barred 
from conducting an investigation or rendering assistance in matters in which they have any 
interest which might preclude them from performing their functions in a fair, unbiased and 
proper manner.250 In addition, the state is barred from interfering with the commission, its 
commissioners or any member of staff in the performance of their duties.251 
Moreover, the ZHRC has control over its day to day activities which is also adds to its 
compliance with the Paris Principles on operational independence. The commission has 
authority to employ its own staff to execute the daily activities of the commission.252 The 
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commission is headed by the executive secretary253 whose mandate is to oversee the day-to-
day administration and management of the affairs, staff and property of the commission.254 
Operational independence is even guarded by the fact that the offices of the executive 
secretary and of the commission’s members of staff do not form part of the Public Service.255  
The full operationalization of the Commission has however been delayed by the 
absence of a Secretariat. The Commission was formed in 2009 and its enabling legislation 
was finalized in October 2012. However, due to the absence of a secretariat, the commission 
could not operate. ZHRC chairperson Mr Elasto Mugwadi was quoted in February 2014 
saying, ‘So far we have recruited the human resources, finance and administration managers 
and a Personal Assistant. We hope by next week we would have recruited the chief executive 
officer.’256  
The ZHRC also complies with the Paris Principles on independence based on 
appointment and dismissal procedures. The ZHRC Act prescribes conditions which can be 
used to determine whether someone is eligible to be appointed as a commissioner;257 terms of 
office and conditions of service of commissioners;258 vacation of office by commissioners;259 
and conditions upon which commissioners may be removed from office.260 The UNDP has 
noted that the non- finalization of the terms and conditions of service of the commissioners 
has delayed the Commission’s work because there was lack of clarity on the commissioners’ 
status.261 
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The ZHRC however does not comply with the Paris Principles on financial independence 
since its inception. The commission’s budget falls under the Ministry of Justice and Legal 
Affairs. The commission has faced acute financial problems that have resulted in it not being 
effectively operational even up to date. The first head of the ZHRC Professor Reginald 
Austin resigned citing the fact that the commission was not ‘independent and properly 
capacitated to comply with the international standards set by the Paris Principles for its 
credibility and recognition to participate as a peer in the international human rights 
community.’262 Austin was frustrated by the fact that the government of Zimbabwe had 
neglected the commission to the extent that it had ‘no budget, no accommodation, and no 
mobility.’263 The extent of the ZHRC’s financial constraint was so dire that the commission 
had to borrow $500 to open a bank account.264  
In addition, the ZHRC is not able to secure its own premises due to lack of funds. The 
government of Zimbabwe gave the ZHRC a building in Harare to operate from. However the 
building is dilapidated and requires extensive renovations before the Commission can occupy 
it. The Danish Institute for Human Rights has rescued the commission by funding the 
temporary office space which it is currently occupying.265  Norway is reportedly assisting to 
fund the commission to purchase vehicles.266  The UNDP has noted that the ZHRC has 
finalized the recruitment of its middle management staff that is, the finance manager, 
administrator, human resources manager and a secretary, the secretariat was not yet on board 
because the commission was awaiting release of funding from Treasury to support salaries 
and operational costs.267  
The lack of funding of the ZHRC has caused international concern to the extent that 
donors have sought to intervene to assist the commission to resume operations in the interest 
of safeguarding human rights in Zimbabwe. The donors have however attached the condition 
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that before they could fund the renovation of the commission’s premises, the government of 
Zimbabwe should provide the commission with $300 000 as a sign of its commitment to 
human rights.268 Following concerns that the government had thus far failed to write a letter 
of commitment to the effect that it would raise the required amount, the government 
responded that it was not amused that the ZHRC was relying on foreign donors, particularly 
from countries deemed hostile to Zimbabwe including the European Union which is one of 
the institutions that imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. Chipanga, a member of the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice stated during the 2014 budget debates that 
‘Given our current financial position and the fact that government is not likely to avail any 
funds in the near future, I wanted to ask a question on whether the commission cannot tell the 
EU to keep their money and when we have money we will give them [the commission].’269 
The attitude with which the government is responding to concerns of the ZHRC’s financial 
incapacitation have led to comments that the government of Zimbabwe lacks political will to 
fully operationalize the commission. Political commentator and member of Crisis Zimbabwe, 
Vivid Gwede called for political will to support the Commission as a solution to problems 
besetting it.270  
The ZHRC however complies with the Paris Principles on competence and 
responsibilities. The commission has a mandate to promote and protect human rights which is 
clearly set forth both in the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the ZHRC Act. It is mandated to 
promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights and freedoms;271 and to 
monitor, assess and ensure observance of human rights and freedoms.272  
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The ZHRC further has responsibility to advice government which is in line with the Paris 
Principles. It is authorized to visit and inspect prisons, places of detention, refugee camps and 
related facilities273 and places where mentally disordered or intellectually handicapped 
persons are detained274 and to make recommendations regarding those conditions to the 
minister responsible for administering the law relating to those places or facilities275 or to 
parliament.276  
Also compliant with the Paris Principles are the ZHRC’s responsibilities to promote 
awareness of and respect for human rights and freedoms at all levels of society;277 to conduct 
research into issues relating to human rights and freedoms;278 as well as to co-operate with 
human rights institutions belonging to international, continental or regional organisations of 
which Zimbabwe is a member.279 
The ZHRC falls short of compliance with the Paris Principles in so far as the 
constitutional and other legislative provisions establishing it do not guarantee pluralism in its 
composition. It however complies with the Paris Principles on the methods of operation. The 
ZHRC provides for procedure at meetings of commission. The commission meets at least 
once in every three months.280 In addition, the ZHRC Act provides for working rroups of the 
commission which are to be established on the basis of human rights thematic areas such as 
Children’s Rights; Gender Equality and Women’s Rights; Civil and Political Rights; 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights; and any other thematic area which the Commission 
may consider necessary.281  
Finally, the ZHRC has quasi-judicial competence. It is authorized to receive and 
consider complaints from the public, where it is alleged that any of the human rights and 
freedoms set out in the Declaration of Rights has been violated and to take such action in 
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regard to the complaints as the commission considers appropriate.282 The commission can 
conduct investigations on its own initiative.283  After investigating human rights issues, the 
commission is required to ensure and provide appropriate redress for injustices and human 
rights violations.284   
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The legal framework in Zimbabwe adequately protects human rights. The Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 joins the South African and Kenyan Constitutions 
in being one of the few African national constitutions which comprehensively guarantee 
human rights. It recognises civil, political, cultural and socio-economic rights. Its only 
shortcoming is section 72 which is deemed unconstitutional for it ousts the jurisdiction of 
courts to review government’s decisions on acquisition or compensation payable in respect of 
acquisition of agricultural land.  
Section 46 (1) (c)  of the 2013 Constitution extends the scope of rights human rights 
protection in Zimbabwe as it requires the Courts and other competent bodies to take 
international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party into account. 
In addition, section 34 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe requires the state to ensure that 
all international conventions, treaties and agreements to which Zimbabwe is a party are 
incorporated into domestic law.  
The Courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, plays an important role in the 
protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. The Courts are vested with authority to enforce the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights in the constitution of Zimbabwe. The independent 
institutions established under Chapter 12 Constitution of Zimbabwe also protect the human 
rights which are recognized and protected in the Bill of Rights.  
The ZHRC which forms part of the Chapter 12 institutions and is the subject of 
investigation in this dissertation has been established in accordance with the Paris Principles 
save for its shortcomings with regards to pluralism and financial independence.  Lack of 
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financial independence has delayed the full operationalization of the ZHRC. The commission 
was established in 2009 but up to date it still has not secured proper accommodation, vehicles 
and staff.  The UNDP is involved in a capacity building support project to assist the ZHRC to 
resume operations. Donors have also demonstrated willingness to assist the ZHRC to become 
operational. It is hoped that these initiatives will resolve the challenges which the ZHRC is 
facing.  
Political will on the part of the government of Zimbabwe is highly recommended as a 
solution to problems besetting it.  If there is political will, success to secure donor funding 
and support for all other initiatives that can ever be initiated by stakeholders in the field of 
human rights protection to assist the ZHRC to operate in line with the Paris Principles is 
guaranteed. This is an important lesson that Botswana can learn from Zimbabwe as it 
establishes its NHRI. 
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CHAPTER 5: TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS INSTITUTION IN BOTSWANA:  
 
5.1. Introduction.  
A study of the legal and institutional framework undertaken under chapters 3 and 4 shows 
that the legal and institutional frameworks in South Africa and Zimbabwe comprehensively 
protect human rights. The South African and Zimbabwean Constitutions recognise and 
economic, social and cultural rights together with civil and political rights.  The two countries 
have also constitutionally established democratic institutions whose functions among others 
is to promote and protect human rights. One of the institutions established by those countries 
is a NHRI. A lesson learnt from the two countries is that even if a country has laws and 
institutions that sufficiently enforce human rights, the establishment of a NHRI is necessary.   
Botswana has a good human rights record as it is ranked ‘free’ by Freedom House, 
receiving a score of 3 out of a worst possible 7 on political rights and a 2 on civil rights.285 
Freedom House also ranks Botswana as one of only 8 ‘free’ countries among the 48 states of 
sub-Saharan Africa, with high scores for both political and civil rights.286  However, there is 
no independent institution that is mandated to deal with human rights issues and has been 
established according to the Paris Principles in Botswana. The study of NHRIs under chapter 
2 has shown that it is pertinent for every state to establish a NHRI. NHRIs are mechanisms 
through which governments ensure implementation of international human rights standards in 
their territories. The absence of a NHRI has been therefore been cited as the cause of human 
rights concerns which have been noted to exist in Botswana.  
This chapter looks at these concerns which form part of the factors that have 
prompted local and international calls for the establishment of a NHRI in Botswana. A study 
of these concerns will reveal whether there exist gaps in Botswana’s legal and institutional 
framework which can be filled by the establishment of a NHRI. Lessons learnt from the 
South Africa and Zimbabwe case studies are then used to suggest the process which is in line 
with the Paris Principles which Botswana should follow to establish its NHRI. 
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5.2. Legal Framework  
The Constitution of Botswana287 guarantees fundamental human rights and mechanisms 
through which those rights can be protected. The fundamental rights that are recognized and 
protected in Botswana are contained in the Bill of Rights under Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
An analysis of the Bill of rights reveals an inclination towards the protection of civil and 
political rights. These include the right to life,288 the right to personal liberty,289 protection 
from slavery and forced labour,290 protection from inhuman treatment,291 protection of 
freedom of expression,292 the right to privacy,293 and protection from discrimination.294 
Socio-economic rights are not entrenched in the Constitution of Botswana. The Constitution 
of Botswana has therefore been described as an ostensibly liberal and conservative 
Constitution whose design to offer fairly limited human rights protection reflects the 
traditional British scepticism towards the entrenchment of human rights.295  
Concerns have been raised about certain provisions of the Constitution of Botswana. 
For example, section 3 of the Constitution was interpreted as guaranteeing equal protection of 
the law for all in Unity Dow v. the Attorney General.296 The CERD is however concerned that 
the definition of discrimination provided under this section does not prohibit discrimination 
on the grounds of descent and national or ethnic origin.297 The CERD is further concerned 
that section 15 of Botswana’s Constitution permits discrimination which is not justified under 
the ICERD as it is not applied pursuant to or is proportional to the achievement of a 
legitimate aim.298 The UNHRC also expressed a concern that section 15 of the Constitution 
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of Botswana does not comply with articles 2, 3, and 26 of the ICCPR.299 In 2004, Botswana 
Parliament amended sections 77 to 79 of the Constitution. The CERD took note of 
Botswana’s willingness to ensure better representation in the House of Chiefs but it has 
expressed concern that such amendment reproduced discriminatory rules relating to the 
participation of ethnic groups in this institution.300  
Concerns have also been raised regarding some of Botswana’s domestic laws. The 
High Court of Botswana held in Kamanakao v Attorney General of Botswana301 that the 
Chieftainship Act was discriminatory as it did not recognise the Wayeyi as one of the tribes 
of Botswana. The court therefore ordered that the Act be amended. The CERD has noted with 
concern that the Botswana has not yet amended the Chieftainship Act as ordered by the High 
Court as such it remains in violation of the ICERD.302 In addition, the CERD has noted that 
the Tribal Territories Act contravenes the ICERD as it discriminates against non-Tswana 
ethnic groups.303 Section 63 (2) of the Penal Code of Botswana provides for death penalty as 
punishment for treason, murder and assault during piracy. Botswana’s status as a death 
retentionist state continues to raise concerns.304 In view of the fact that Botswana laws do not 
define torture, the UNHRC has suggested that Botswana should criminalise torture and offer 
reparations to torture victims.305 The UNHRC has also condemned the laws of Botswana that 
permit corporal punishment.306  
In addition, some of Botswana’s policies have been criticised for displaying a 
shortcoming in the protection of human rights. The CERD has noted that Botswana has 
implemented its objective to build a nation based on the principle of equality for all in a 
manner that is detrimental to the protection of cultural and ethnic diversity.307 Of particular 
reference is the relocation of the San/Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve to 
formal settlements where the Government of Botswana is of the view that they will be 
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developed and would equally access infrastructure and services like all Batswana. This 
culminated into court a case: Sesana v Attorney General.308 The CERD has noted that in 
relocating the San/Basarwa, the government of Botswana did not pay particular attention to 
the fact that the relocation would sever the close cultural ties that the San/Basarwa have to 
their ancestral land and to their economic activities such as hunting and gathering practices 
that are an important aspect of their culture.309 The CERD has noted that Botswana is 
reluctant to recognize the existence of indigenous peoples on its territory hence it urged 
Botswana to respect and protect the existence and cultural identities of all ethnic groups, as 
well as to review its policy on indigenous peoples.310 The UNHRC has also criticised 
Botswana for overcrowded prisons and a large number of prison remands.311  
Unlike its South African and Zimbabwean counterparts, the Constitution of Botswana 
does not provide for the status of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of rights. In 
Attorney- General v Dow,312 the court held that treaty law cannot automatically be applied in 
Botswana. Parliament has to domesticate international law through an Act of Parliament in 
order for it to be applicable in Botswana. The Interpretation Act however opens a door for the 
application of international law in Botswana. It provides that treaties may be used in 
interpreting the law where the wording of an Act of Parliaments is unclear. 313  In Amadou 
Oury Bah v Libyan Embassy,314 the Industrial Court also held that customary international 
law is applicable in Botswana if it is consistent with national laws. Botswana is party to some 
international and regional human rights instruments that promote and protect human rights.  
Out of the ten core international human rights instruments315 Botswana is party to 
only five and these are: ICERD; ICCPR; CEDAW; CAT; and . Regionally, Botswana is party 
to the African Charter, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human 
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and Peoples’ Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.316 These 
treaties and all other international instruments will apply in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights in Botswana if Parliament has passed a law domesticating them, where the wording of 
an Act of Parliaments is unclear or if they are consistent with national laws. 
 
5.3. Institutional Framework   
The Constitution of Botswana recognises a separation of powers. Just like the Constitution of 
South Africa, there is no express mention of the word ‘separation of powers’ but the principle 
of separation of powers is implied in the establishment of the three branches of government 
in the Constitution. One of the three branches of government, namely, the judiciary, 
particularly the High Court has been the main mechanism for the protection of human rights 
since independence. Section 18 of the Constitution of Botswana defines the role of the courts 
of Botswana in protecting human rights. An aggrieved party can apply to the High Court for 
redress alleging actual or a threat of violation of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.317  
The High Court has original jurisdiction in relation to hear and determine applications of 
alleged actual or threatened human rights violation.318 The fact that the High Court is vested 
with original jurisdiction in such matters does not however preclude a subordinate court from 
dealing with the interpretation of a Bill of rights if it arises during any of its proceedings.319  
If one of the parties in a matter being determined before a subordinate court requests 
that the matter be referred to the High Court, the presiding officer is may grant or decline 
such a request.320 If the request is granted, the High Court shall have jurisdiction to determine 
the question arising in such a case.321 The remedies which the High Court can order include 
issuing writs and giving directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that 
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justice is duly administered.322 This is a significantly wide scope of powers endowed on the 
High Court. 
The courts of Botswana have so far interpreted and enforced various provisions of the 
Bill of Rights. A critical review of these cases is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, a sample of such cases is worth undertaking to demonstrate the role which the 
Courts of Botswana continue to play in the protection of human rights. The Courts of 
Botswana have dealt with cases involving the interpretation and enforcement of the right to 
life;323 freedom of conscience;324 the right to personal liberty;325 freedom of expression;326 
protection from deprivation of property;327 protection from inhuman treatment;328 freedom 
from discrimination;329 the right to protection of the law;330 and freedom of association.331 
The courts of Botswana continue to play a significant role in the protection of human rights.  
Unlike in South Africa and Zimbabwe, institutions that support democracy in 
Botswana are not constitutionally entrenched. Such institutions are established by Acts of 
Parliament and these are: Independent Electoral Commission; Office of the Ombudsman and 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime. Although the civil society is neither 
constitutionally entrenched nor statutorily regulated, it continues to play a vital role in 
promoting human rights alongside these institutions. The Ombudsman Office has been 
presented by Botswana to the international community as an institution with a mandate to 
promote and protect human rights.332 This chapter examines the extent to which the 
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Ombudsman protects human rights in Botswana. This is done through examining whether its 
mandate and functions comply with the Paris Principles. 
 
5.3.1. The Office of the Ombudsman 
The Office of the Ombudsman is established by the Ombudsman Act.333  The mandate of the 
Office of the Ombudsman is to investigate alleged acts of maladministration perpetrated on 
members of the public by the government or authority in which government is a 
stakeholder.334 The purpose of establishing the Ombudsman office which is apparent in the 
preamble of the Ombudsman Act is to investigate maladministration in public institutions.  
In the UPR country report of 2008, Botswana submitted that the Ombudsman’s 
jurisdiction extends to the investigation of alleged violations of constitutionally enshrined 
fundamental rights and freedoms.335 The Office of the Ombudsman also revealed to the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights that it deemed itself to have the mandate 
to deal with human rights issues.336 Both the Botswana government and the Office of the 
Ombudsman based their submissions on interpretation of section 3(3)(b of the Ombudsman 
Act which provides that: 
 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2), the Ombudsman- (b) shall not in any case be precluded from 
conducting an investigation in respect of any matter by reason only that it is open to the aggrieved person to 
apply to the High Court for redress under section 18 of the Constitution (which relates to redress for 
contraventions of the provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms).’ 
 
The interpretation that section 3(3)(b) of the Ombudsman Act confers the 
Ombudsman with a mandate to deal with human rights issues has been negated. It has been 
argued that:  
‘Firstly an interpretation of section 3 (3)(b) of the Act does not lend credence to the assertion that the 
Ombudsman has been clothed with the mandate to deal with human rights issues. The correct interpretation of 
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this provision is that the Ombudsman is not, in the event that he is entitled to investigate a matter in accordance 
with the Act, precluded from investigating on account of the fact that the complaint has a right to approach the 
High Court under Section 18 of the Constitution. In the absence of any other specific provision mandating the 
Ombudsman to handle human rights issues, the provision does not clothe the Ombudsman with the power to 
investigate human rights violations. Secondly, a holistic interpretation of the provisions of the Act does not 
support this assertion particularly because the redress scheme of the Act is not designed to deal with human 
rights complaints. The fact that action taken with respect to orders or directions to the Botswana Police Service 
of Botswana Defence Force or members thereof cannot be investigated further buttresses the point that the 
whole scheme of the Act was not crafted to investigate and address the allegations of human rights violations. 
Excluding these institutions from possible investigations will deprive those who have been subjected to police 
brutality, for example, from obtaining any redress. ’337  
 
The essence of this argument is that the Ombudsman is not a NHRI. NHRIs have been 
defined as independent bodies which governments have established for the specific purpose 
of promoting and protecting human rights.338 The Office of the Ombudsman is only mandated 
to investigate complaints of maladministration and it has not been specifically mandated to 
investigate human rights issues.  
A further argument is made that the Ombudsman Act legislates for only one function 
of the Office of the ombudsman which is investigation of alleged maladministration in the 
public sector. The Paris Principles on the other hand establish seven responsibilities of 
NHRIs. These are: to advise government and any other competent bodies concerning the 
promotion and protection of human rights; to promote and ensure the harmonization of 
national legislation and practices with international human rights practice; to encourage 
ratification, accession and implementation of  international human rights instruments; to 
contribute to the reports which states are required to submit to the UN bodies and committees 
and to regional institutions; to cooperate with the UN and any other organisation in and other 
national human rights institutions; to assist in the formulation of programmes for the teaching 
and research into human rights and to take part in their execution; and publicising human 
rights through education and the press.339 None of these responsibilities appear as a function 
of the Office of the Ombudsman in the Ombudsman Act. The Office of the Ombudsman 
therefore does not comply with the Paris principles on competence.340   
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Although the Ombudsman does not have de jure jurisdiction to handle allegations of human 
rights violations, it appears that it has assumed that mandate nonetheless. 341  It has been 
revealed that the Ombudsman deals with human rights violation complaints from prisoners.342 
This dissertation notes that human rights protestations reported by prisoners at the Office of 
the Ombudsman are not the only human rights violations that exist in the country. The former 
Ombudsman of Botswana, Lepodise, noted that there is an increasing number of human 
rights violations in Botswana and acknowledged the incapacity of his office to handle these 
matters. He recommended that Botswana should establish a NHRI.343   
Leodise’s submission syncs with the observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child. while taking note of the existence of the Office of the Ombudsman in Botswana, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concerns at the fact that the office lacks the 
necessary human and financial resources for proper functioning.344 The UNHRC also 
acknowledged the existence of the Office of the Ombudsman but expressed concern that 
there is no national human rights institution in Botswana. It therefore called for the 
establishment of such an institution in accordance with the Paris Principles.345  
Botswana accepted the recommendation to establish an independent NHRI for the 
promotion and protection of human rights at its UPR session in 2008. The government of 
Botswana is still engaged in the process of establishing the institution. In November 2013, 
Botswana advertised the post of Deputy Permanent Secretary under the Ministry Defence, 
Justice and Security to facilitate the creation and functioning of a NHRI.346 This effort is 
commendable. It signifies that advocacy for the need to establish a NHRI in Botswana has 
been successful. It signifies that Botswana recognises that there is an institutional gap 
hampering the promotion and protection of human rights.  
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The next section discusses the lessons learnt from the South Africa and Zimbabwe case 
studies to suggest the process which is in line with the Paris Principles which Botswana 
should follow to establish its NHRI. 
 
5.4. Lessons from South Africa and Zimbabwe 
5.4.1. Competence and responsibilities of national human rights institutions 
It has been established that the Paris Principles require NHRIs to be given the mandate to 
promote and protect human rights through the constitution or legislation.347 The SAHRC has 
been found to comply with this requirement as it is established in the Constitution and under 
the SAHRC Act. These two Acts of Parliament expressly give the SAHRC a human rights 
mandate which includes: to promote respect for human rights and a culture of human 
rights,348 to promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights;349 and to 
monitor and assess the observance of human rights in South Africa.  
The ZHRC was also found to be in compliance with the Paris Principle requiring that 
NHRIs must be given the mandate to promote and protect human rights through a 
constitutional or legislative text. The ZHRC is established in the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
and its functions as stipulated in the Constitution of Zimbabwe and in the ZHRC Act include 
promoting the protection, development and attainment of human rights and freedoms;350 and 
to monitor, assess and ensure observance of human rights and freedoms.351  
The lesson which Botswana can derive from the above discussion is that it must 
establish its NHRIs in the Constitution. There will be need for the constitution to be amended 
in order to accommodate this initiative. There must also be an Act of Parliament which 
provides for the powers and functions of the institution.  Both the Constitution and the Act of 
Parliament must expressly give the NHRI a human rights promotion and protection mandate. 
It has also been established that the Paris Principles require NHRIs to have 
responsibility to advice government, parliament and any other competent bodies on human 
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rights matters.352 The SAHRC Act accordingly gives the SAHRC the mandate to advice the 
government of South Africa on the implementation of and compliance with international and 
regional law.353 The same applies to the ZHRC.354 A lesson derived from this discussion is 
that the legislation establishing the NHRI in Botswana must give the institution a mandate to 
advice government and any other competent body on issues of human rights.  
In addition, it has been established that the Paris Principles require NHRIs to promote 
and ensure the harmonization of national legislation and practices with international human 
rights practices.355 NHRIs are also mandated to encourage the state to ratify international 
human rights instruments and to ensure their effective implementation on the ground.356 The 
SAHRC performs the mandate to advise the government of South Africa on the 
implementation of and compliance with international and regional law.357 In advising the 
government of South Africa on the implementation of and compliance with international and 
regional law, the SAHRC also ensures the harmonization of national legislation with 
international human rights instruments to which South Africa is a party to as well 
encouraging ratification of such instruments.   
In contrast, there are no provision in the ZHRC Act which give the ZHRC the 
mandate to promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation and practices with 
international human rights practices. There is also no provision which gives the ZHRC the 
mandate to encourage the state to ratify international human rights instruments and to ensure 
their effective implementation on the ground. In order to comply with the Paris Principles, 
Botswana is encouraged to legislate for its NHRI to promote and ensure the harmonization of 
national legislation and practices with international human rights practices. The legislation 
must also have a provision that gives the national human rights institution a function to 
encourage the ratification of international human rights instruments and to ensure their 
effective implementation.  
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Moreover, it has been established that the Paris Principles require cooperation of NHRIs with 
regional institutions and the national institutions of other countries.358 The SAHRC Act 
mandates the SAHRC to maintain close liaison with institutions, bodies and authorities with 
similar objectives in order to foster common policies and practices.359 The ZHRC also has 
responsibilities to co-operate with human rights institutions belonging to international, 
continental or regional organisations of which Zimbabwe is a member.360 This therefore leads 
to the conclusion that in order to comply with the Paris Principles, the legislation establishing 
the NHRI in Botswana must give it the mandate to cooperate with NHRIs of other countries. 
It has further been established that the Paris Principles require NHRIs to have the 
responsibility to contribute to the reports which states are required to submit to the different 
treaty monitoring bodies.361  There are no provisions in the Constitution of SAHRC Act 
which expressly state that the SAHRC shall contribute to the reports which South Africa is 
required to submit to the different treaty monitoring bodies. However, it can be argued that 
by submitting reports to the National Assembly pertaining to treaties, conventions covenants 
or charters which South Africa is party to,362 the SAHRC is contributing to the reports which 
South Africa is required to submit to the different treaty monitoring bodies. The government 
of South Africa can use such information in compiling its reports to the treaty monitoring 
bodies 
On the other hand, the ZHRC is mandated to require any person, institution or agency 
to provide it with the information that it needs to prepare any report required to be submitted 
to any regional or international body under any human rights convention, treaty or agreement 
to which Zimbabwe is a party.363 This section is an express mandate given to the ZHRC to 
contribute to the reports which Zimbabwe is required to submit to the treaty monitoring 
bodies. A lesson learnt from this discussion is that in order to comply with the Paris 
Principles, it is pertinent for Botswana to give its NHRI a function to contribute to the reports 
which it [Botswana] is required to submit to different treaty monitoring bodies. This would 
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remedy the concern which was previously raised that Botswana has a ‘backlog of reports in 
almost all international human rights protection bodies’. 364 
Penultimately, it has been established that the Paris Principles require NHRIs to 
publicize human rights and increase public awareness, especially through information and 
education and all press organs.365 The SAHRC Act gives the SAHRC the mandate to 
educate366 and to develop an awareness of human rights among all the people of South 
Africa.  The ZHRC Act also gives the ZHRC the mandate to promote awareness of and 
respect for human rights and freedoms at all levels of society.367 In seeking to establish a 
NHRI which is compliant to the Paris Principles, Botswana must therefore follow South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. Botswana must legislate for its NHRI to be responsible for publicising 
human rights and ensuring public awareness through education and the media.  
  Finally, it has been established that the Paris Principles require NHRIs to develop and 
be involved in the implementation of educational human rights curriculum for schools, 
universities and professional cadres as well as to encourage research into human rights.368 
The SAHRC Act mandates the SAHRC to develop, conduct and manage information and 
education programmes to as well as to encourage research into human rights.369  The ZHRC 
on the other hand has not been enabled to carry out such a function. It has only been given a 
function to research into human rights issues.370 In order to comply with the Paris Principles, 
Botswana must take the approach taken by South Africa by giving its NHRI the mandate to 
contribute to the development and teaching of human rights syllabuses at various learning 
institutions and to encourage research into human rights issues. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
364 Op cit (n8).  
365 Op cit (n55). 
366 Op cit (n172). 
367 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s 243 (1)(a). 
368 Op cit (n56). 
369 South African Human Rights Commission, s 13 (1)(a)(b)(i). 
370 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s 241 (1)(j). 
57 
 
 
5.4.2. Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism 
It has been established that the Paris Principles provide that the composition of a NHRI and 
the appointment of its members should be done through a process which ensures pluralism.371 
Pluralism refers to the representation of the social stakeholders involved in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. In that regard, the Constitution of South Africa mandates the 
SAHRC to consider race and gender in the appointment of its members.372  In contrast, the 
constitutional and other legislative provisions establishing the ZHRC do not guarantee 
pluralism in its [the commission’s] composition. Botswana is advised to ensure that the 
legislation establishing its NHRI guarantees pluralism by providing for the appointment of 
various stakeholders who are involved in human rights promotion and protection. 
It has further been established that NHRIs are required to be independent373 and that 
four factors are used to gauge the independence of national human rights institutions. These 
are: legal autonomy, operational independence, financial independence and independence 
through appointment and dismissal procedures.374  
Both the SAHRC and the ZHRC were found to have legal autonomy. As stated under 
‘competencies and responsibilities’ above, both these institutions are established in the 
Constitution and in an Act of Parliament. In addition, it is clear within the Constitution and 
the Act of Parliament establishing these two institutions that they [the commissions] have the 
mandate to promote and protect human rights. As already recommended above, Botswana 
must establish its NHRI in the Constitution and in an Act of Parliament and expressly give it 
the mandate to protect and promote human rights.  
In addition, both the SAHRC and the ZHRC have been found to comply with the 
principle of independence based on appointment and dismissal procedures. The procedures to 
be followed in the appointment and dismissal of the members of these commissions are 
provided for in the respective constitutions and Acts of Parliament. Moreover, both the 
SAHRC and the ZHRC comply with the principle of operational independence as they are at 
liberty to determine how to conduct their day to day activities. Botswana must therefore 
provide for the terms of appointment and dismissal of its members in the legislation 
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establishing its NHRI. The legislation must further give the institution independence to 
conduct its daily business without government direction or control. This would be 
compliance with the Paris Principles.   
Finally, concerns have been raised concerning compliance of the SAHRC and the 
ZHRC with the principle of financial independence. The SAHRC has raised concerns about 
the placement of its budget under the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
The commission has stated that this arrangement negatively impacts on its compliance with 
the Paris Principles. It has consequently requested that its budget should fall under 
Parliament’s budget vote.375 The SAHRC’s other concern is that its budget is not sufficient to 
enable it to carry out its functions effectively. As a result it has relied on donor funding for 
the socio-economic rights reporting process. 376  
The ZHRC has also faced challenges of complying with the principle of financial 
independence. Just like the SAHRC, the placement of the ZHRC’s budget under the Ministry 
of Justice and Legal Affairs negatively affects its compliance with the Paris Principles. In 
addition, the ZHRC has faced acute financial problems that have resulted in it not being 
effectively operational even up to date. The lack of funding of the ZHRC has caused 
international concern to the extent that donors have sought to intervene to assist the 
commission to resume operations in the interest of safeguarding human rights in Zimbabwe. 
The attitude with which the government is responding to concerns of the ZHRC’s financial 
incapacitation has led to comments that the government of Zimbabwe lacks political will to 
fully operationalize the commission.  
The experiences of the SAHRC and the ZHRC on financial independence serve as a 
very important lesson for Botswana. Botswana is advised not to place the budget of its NHRI 
under any government department as this gives the impression that the institution is part of 
government. The SAHRC is currently fighting the battle to have its budget removed from the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. It would be unfortunate for 
Botswana, having had the opportunity to benchmark best practices from countries which have 
established NHRIs before it (in this instant, South Africa and Zimbabwe) to repeat the 
mistakes which such countries have made. It is appropriate that the budget of the institution 
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be placed under the National Assembly as the institution is responsible to Parliament for the 
performance of its functions.  
Finally, Botswana is advised to have political will to support its NHRI to function effectively. 
The case of Zimbabwe has illustrated that lack of political will can hinder the NHRI from 
even beginning to operate. This is so because NHRIs must be funded by their states. If the 
government of any particular state is not desirous to have its NHRI to function at all or to 
function effectively, such lack of political will be evident in lack of or insufficient funding. 
 
5.4.3. Methods of operation 
It has been established that the Paris Principles provide that in their operations, NHRIs  shall 
freely consider any question falling within their competence;377 hear any person and obtain 
any information necessary to assess situations within their jurisdiction;378 address the public 
directly or through the media;379 hold regular members’ meetings;380 establish working 
groups and local or regional sections to help in the performance of their functions;381  
maintain consultations with other bodies whose mandate is to promote and protect human 
rights such as ombudsmen and mediators;382 and develop relations to NGOs devoted to 
promoting and protecting human rights.383 
It is worth noting that the above listed methods of operation are required to be evident 
within the whole framework of an institution’s operation. They need not be expressly 
specified in legislation as ‘methods of operation’. They can be encapsulated under various 
provisions of the Act, for example, under ‘functions’ the SAHRC Act among other things 
requires the SAHRC to liaise and interact with any organisation which actively promotes 
respect for human rights and other sectors of civil society to further the objectives of the 
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commission.384 Under ‘investigations’, the SAHRC Act empowers the SAHRC to obtain 
information necessary for its investigations from anyone.385  
 In the same token, the ZHRC also complies with this part of the Paris Principles in 
various provisions of its Act. For example, the ZHRC Act provides for procedure at the 
meetings of the commission386  and establishes working groups of the commission.387 The 
lesson to be learnt by Botswana is therefore that the legislative framework which establishes 
its NHRI must be found to encompass the Paris Principles on ‘Methods of operation’ when 
viewed holistically. 
 
5.4.4. Additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi-
jurisdictional competence   
The Paris Principles provide that NHRIs may be authorised to receive and investigate 
reported human rights violations388 and offer appropriate remedies.389 In line with this 
principle, the SAHRC is empowered by the Constitution to investigate actual or threatened 
human rights violations.390 The SAHRC Act then details the investigation process to be 
followed.391 The ZHRC also has quasi-judicial competence as it is authorized to receive and 
consider complaints of human rights violations from the public392 and provide appropriate 
redress.393 In order to comply with the Paris Principles, Botswana is advised to establish a 
NHRI with quasi-jurisdictional competence just like South African and Zimbabwe. The 
powers of investigation and remedies (particularly mediation and conciliation) must clearly 
be specified in the legislation establishing the institution.  
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5.5. Conclusion 
The Constitution of Botswana does not adequately protect human rights. It provides for civil 
and political rights only. It does not provide for socio-economic rights. There is a need for 
constitutional reform to bring the Botswana Constitution to the standard of the Constitutions 
of South Africa and Zimbabwe which recognise and protect cultural, social and economic 
rights over and above civil and political rights. Although international law is very important 
in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as seen in the Constitutions of South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, the Constitution of Botswana does not mention the status of international law in 
the interpretation of the Bill of rights. Although such an omission is compensated for by the 
interpretation Act and case law, there is a need for the Constitution to be amended to have a 
clause providing for the use of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
Such a clause will serve as authority for invalidation of laws and policies which are 
inconsistent with international law.  
The courts of Botswana continue to play an important role in the protection of human 
rights in Botswana. To optimise the judicial enforcement of Human rights, Botswana should 
consider establishing a constitutional court to specialise in constitutional issues and enforce 
the Bill of Rights. That is the case in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The emerging 
international trend is to constitutionally establish independent institutions to safeguard 
democracy and protect human rights over and above the use of the courts as human rights 
enforcement mechanisms.  Botswana has established such institutions, namely the Electoral 
commission, the Directorate of Corruption and economic Crime and the Ombudsman. The 
institutions are not constitutionally entrenched hence the need to amend the constitution to 
entrench them therein. 
  There is a gap in Botswana’s institutional framework. There is no NHRI which is 
established according to the Paris principles and has a specific mandate to promote and 
protect human rights. The Office of the Ombudsman which is perceived to have the mandate 
to protect human rights does not have such a mandate. It has assumed the mandate to 
investigate human rights violations nonetheless. So far the office has reported that it 
investigates prisoners’ human rights violation reports. Concerns have been raised that the 
office does not have the mandate as well as financial, human resources and expertise capacity 
to handle human rights issues. The UNHRC and the Commission on the Rights of the Child 
have acknowledged the presence of the Ombudsman but maintained that the Ombudsman is 
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not a NHRI and have called upon the government of Botswana to establish a national 
institution with specific mandate to promote and protect human rights.  
Botswana undertook to establish a NHRI in 2008 at its first UPR session. Plans are 
underway for the establishment of such and institution. It is recommended that the legislation 
establishing such an institution must comply with the Paris Principles relating to composition 
and guarantees of independence and pluralism as well as methods of operation. The relevant 
legislation must also empower the NHRI to carry out the functions that are provided for in the 
Paris Principles which are: investigation of human rights violation reports, advising 
government on matters concerning the promotion and protection of human rights, promoting 
and ensuring the harmonization of national laws with international human rights instruments, 
encouraging ratification of international human rights instruments and ensuring their 
implementation, contributing to the report which Botswana is required to submit to the UN 
bodies, cooperating with UN, regional and other national institutions that are involved in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, researching and formulating human rights 
education curriculum and publicizing human rights through information and education.394  
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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This dissertation has discussed the concept of NHRIs in chapter 2. The chapter has defined 
and traced the evolution of NHRIs. It has been established that NHRIs are an integral part of 
the human rights protection system. Their formation was encouraged by the international 
community after realisation that states fail to ratify international human rights instruments or 
if they do, they fail to domestically incorporate the said instruments into their domestic laws. 
NHRI therefore complement the UN and regional systems in the promotion and protection of 
human rights by assisting states to comply with their international human rights obligations.  
The Paris Principles guide states on how to establish effectively functioning NHRI. 
These principles were passed through a UN resolution and they have become a framework for 
the functions and structure of NHRIs. The Paris Principles require that NHRIs must advise 
government on matters concerning the promotion and protection of human rights, promote 
and ensure the harmonization of national laws with international human rights instruments, 
encourage ratification of international human rights instruments and ensure their 
implementation, contribute to the reports which Botswana is required to submit to the UN 
bodies, cooperate with UN, regional and other national institutions that are involved in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, research and formulate human rights education 
curriculum and publicize human rights through information and education.395  
In addition, the Paris Principles require that national laws establishing NHRIs must 
guarantee pluralism and independence of those institutions.396 Finally, national laws 
establishing NHRIs must provide for their mode of operation as established in the Paris 
Principles, for example, holding of regular meetings and formation of commissions of the 
committee specialising on thematic areas of human rights.397 
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the SAHRC and ZHRC respectively. Emphasis was placed 
on examining their compliance with the Paris Principles. The findings reveal that the national 
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laws establishing both the SAHRC and ZHRC substantially comply with the Paris Principles. 
Their shortcoming lies in the fact that they are both established under the Ministry of Justice 
in their respective countries which has negative implications on their financial independence. 
The placing of these institutions under government ministries makes them appear like they 
are part of government. The Zimbabwe case study particularly reveals that it is important for 
states to show political will to support their NHRIs. The lack of political will on the part of 
the Zimbabwean government has led to the delayed operation of the ZHRC. The Commission 
is not only constrained by lack of financial support from the government but it is constrained 
by government’s lack of political will to meet the requirements of financial donors who have 
displayed interest to bail it from financial crisis. 
 The study of the legal and institutional framework undertaken under chapters 3 and 4 
was meant to justify the findings made in chapter 5 that despite its good human rights record, 
there is a need for Botswana to establish a NHRI. It has been demonstrated that South Africa 
and Zimbabwe have established NHRIs to specifically promote and protect human rights 
despite the fact that their laws comprehensively protect human rights and despite the fact that 
they have various other institutions that enforce and protect human rights. The legal and 
institutional gaps identified in Botswana’s human rights protection system in Botswana 
further justify the conclusion that there is a need to establish a NHRI to specifically promote 
and protect human rights in Botswana. The establishment of a NHRI in Botswana will not 
only improve the institutional human rights protection framework but it would also improve 
Botswana’s legal framework. The NHRI will advise the Botswana government to ratify 
treaties and domesticate them in national laws as well to monitor and report on human rights 
issues. It will lobby for the invalidation of laws and policies which are inconsistent with 
international human rights standards as contained in various international instruments.  
Botswana has undertaken to establish such an institution. The purpose of this chapter is 
therefore make recommendations in relation to the issues raised by previous chapters in order 
to ensure that Botswana establishes a NHRI which complies with the Paris Principles. 
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6.2. Recommendations 
6.2.1. Constitutional reform  
The discussion in chapter 5 has indicated that the Constitution of Botswana does not provide 
for cultural, civil and political rights. It also does not have provide for institutions that 
support democracy and protect human rights. Concerns have been raised that the Constitution 
does not combat discrimination and define torture. Many laws and policies in Botswana have 
also been found to be contrary to international law. It is recommended that the Constitution of 
Botswana should be amended to recognise and protect cultural, social and economic rights as 
well as to entrench institutions that support democracy and promote human rights. In 
addition, although international law is very important in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights as seen in the Constitutions of South Africa and Zimbabwe, the Constitution of 
Botswana does not mention the status of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of 
rights. Despite such an omission being compensated for by the interpretation Act and case 
law, there is a need for the Constitution to be amended to have a clause that provides for the 
use of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights  
Further, to optimise the judicial enforcement of Human rights, Botswana should 
consider constitutionally establishing a constitutional court to specialise in constitutional 
issues and enforce the Bill of Rights. That is the case in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
Furthermore the emerging international trend is to constitutionally establish independent 
institutions to safeguard democracy and protect human rights over and above the use of the 
courts as human rights enforcement mechanisms.  Botswana has established such institutions, 
namely the Electoral commission, the Directorate of Corruption and economic Crime and the 
Ombudsman. The institutions are not constitutionally entrenched hence the need to amend the 
constitution to entrench them therein. It is pertinent for the NHRI which Botswana is in the 
process of establishing to be established in the Constitution to ensure its independence.  
    
 6.2.2. Financial Independence and political will 
Chapter 3 discussed political will as a major contributor to the lack of financial independence 
on the part of the ZHRC. The government of Zimbabwe cannot fund the ZHRC to function 
effectively yet it cannot cooperate with donors who wish to assist the Commission to come to 
full operationalization. It is apparent that there is no political will to get the ZHRC to function 
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effectively. It is therefore recommended that Botswana must provide political will to the 
NHRI which it is establishing to ensure compliance with the Paris Principles. Such political 
will be evident in sufficient funding of the NHRI and cooperation with donors to enable the 
NHRI to have financial independence to acquire premises, purchase cars, carry out its 
functions and employ and pay its personnel decently.  
 
6.3. Concluding remarks 
The pertinent aspect of establishing a NHRI does not only lie in meeting formal legal 
requirements of the Paris Principles but it is also about practical implementation of the said 
requirements. Both the South Africa and Zimbabwe case studies have shown that it is one 
thing to comply with all the Paris Principles in legislation and it is another to operate a NHRI 
in accordance with the Paris Principles. South Africa has not only legislated for a Paris 
Principles compliant NHRI but the SAHRC has been operated in a manner that complies with 
the Paris Principles. Practical demonstration of the SAHRC’s compliance with the Paris 
Principles was done under chapter 3.As a result, the SAHRC has been accredited as an ‘A 
status’ National human rights institution by the ICC since 1999. The commission sits in the 
ICC Bureau consisting of 16 ‘A status’ National human rights institution representing the 
four regions of the ICC providing leadership in the promotion and protection of human rights 
to other NHRIs. The ZHRC on the other hand has been criticised as a paper tiger which only 
serves to tick national democracy reform boxes as opposed to performing the functions which 
it is established to perform. It is yet to function effectively despite having been established in 
2009. Finally, Political will on the part of states is important for both the effective 
establishment and functioning of a NHRI.  
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